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Abstract 
 
 
 
Agency problems between corporate managers and financiers/banks are common 
issues in corporate governance literature. In this paper we try to reduce the moral 
hazards problem of corporate managers’ profit misreporting as an agency problem  
in Profit and loss sharing contracts (PLS). To minimize this risk, we propose  
that the financier/bank sell a real option to the corporate manager giving her the  
right to gradually own the corporation. Since the share of the financier diminishes 
periodically we refer to this mode as diminishing PLS. 
 
We use a repeated game theoretical approach by combining diminishing PLS with real 
options. To test our model, we code a program in Netlogo to create an agent-based simulation 
environment where we compare case of diminishing PLS with real options and the case 
without.  
 
We found evidence that under real options cooperation can be sustained 
by having Managers not misreporting profits. On the other hand, defection 
occurs under no real option.  
 
We also found that there exists a higher social value under real options than under the case 
without. To promote this case of high social value, it is necessary to provide the manager with 
a specified monetary incentive. 
 
This model is of practical use as it allows for the calculation of the real option 
premium and the monetary incentive to sustain true profit reporting.  
 Practicality: 
• This model is of practical use as it allows for the calculation of the real option premium and 
the monetary incentive necessary to sustain true profit reporting.  
• This Model can be used as a decision tool to monitor profit misreporting behaviour for 
institutions engaged or willing to engage in PLS contracts.  
• This Project was partially funded by the IDB development Bank and supported its 
paracticality. 
Contribution/originality 
• No previous model has combined real options with PLS contract and agent-based simulation. 
 
 
